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Abstract 
Background: Hand‑hygiene compliance and contacts of health‑care workers largely determine the potential paths 
of pathogen transmission in hospital wards. We explored how the combination of data collected by two automated 
infrastructures based on wearable sensors and recording (1) use of hydro‑alcoholic solution and (2) contacts of 
health‑care workers provide an enhanced view of the risk of transmission events in the ward.
Methods: We perform a proof‑of‑concept observational study. Detailed data on contact patterns and hand‑hygiene 
compliance of health‑care workers were collected by wearable sensors over 12 days in an infectious disease unit of a 
hospital in Marseilles, France.
Results: 10,837 contact events among 10 doctors, 4 nurses, 4 nurses’ aids and 4 housekeeping staff were recorded 
during the study. Most contacts took place among medical doctors. Aggregate contact durations were highly hetero‑
geneous and the resulting contact network was highly structured. 510 visits of health‑care workers to patients’ rooms 
were recorded, with a low rate of hand‑hygiene compliance. Both data sets were used to construct histories and sta‑
tistics of contacts informed by the use of hydro‑alcoholic solution, or lack thereof, of the involved health‑care workers.
Conclusions: Hand‑hygiene compliance data strongly enrich the information concerning contacts among health‑
care workers, by assigning a ‘safe’ or ‘at‑risk’ value to each contact. The global contact network can thus be divided into 
‘at‑risk’ and ‘safe’ contact networks. The combined data could be of high relevance for outbreak investigation and to 
inform data‑driven models of nosocomial disease spread.
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Background
Hospital Acquired Infections (HAI) represent a major 
risk for patient safety and health, leading to prolonged 
stay and increased mortality [1–3], and has high eco-
nomic costs. The dynamics of pathogen transmission in 
hospital wards involves at least two components linked to 
the behavior of healthcare workers (HCWs): compliance 
to hand-hygiene protocols [4, 5] and contacts between 
HCWs that might lead to transmission events [6, 7]. In 
order to better understand such dynamics and ultimately 
develop prevention and containment measures, recent 
studies have concerned each of these two components.
On the one hand, detailed investigations of hand-
hygiene compliance (HHC) of HCWs have been 
performed using techniques ranging from direct obser-
vation, still considered as a gold standard but costly, to 
sensors monitoring the use of hydro-alcoholic solution 
(HAS) by HCWs [8–10].
On the other hand, the recent development of unob-
strusive wearable sensors has also made possible the 
collection of data describing the contact patterns of 
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individuals with high spatial and temporal resolutions 
in various contexts [11–14], including hospital wards 
[15–19]. Moreover, the combination of contact data with 
microbiological data has been shown to provide evidence 
for the occurrence of transmission events of pathogens 
upon close proximity of individuals [18, 19].
Contact data and hand-hygiene compliance data have 
however, to our knowledge, not been studied in combina-
tion, although numerical studies using agent-based mod-
els of hospital wards have clearly highlighted that both 
aspects play an important role in the potential spread 
of HAI outbreaks [6, 7]. Here, we perform a first step in 
this direction through a proof-of-concept study in which 
we explore the merging of data coming from two data-
collection infrastructures based on wearable sensors: 
MediHandTrace (MHT) [9], which monitors the use of 
HAS by HCWs, and the SocioPatterns infrastructure, 
which records the close face-to-face proximity of indi-
viduals. We show how combining such data provides an 
enhanced view of the risk of transmission events in the 
ward: indeed, the temporal network of contacts between 
HCWs and of visits of HCWs to patients’ rooms results 
enriched by the information about hand-hygiene com-
pliance of the individuals involved in each contact event. 
Such combined data could be of high relevance for out-
break investigation and to inform data-driven models of 
nosocomial disease spread.
Methods
Setting and data collection
Data were collected from Monday, July 7, 2014 to Friday, 
July 18, 2014 without interruption, i.e., 24  h per day, in 
the Infectious Disease Unit of the Hôpital Nord in Mar-
seilles, France. The study involved 7 rooms with patients 
and 22 healthcare workers (HCWs), categorized into 4 
classes according to their role in the ward: 10 medical 
doctors (MED), 4 nurses (NUR), 4 nurses’ aids (NURA) 
and 4 housekeeping staff (HKS). HCWs were present in 
the ward in shifts of 8 h.
For each day, each room was charaterized by a specific 
type of isolation requirement: “Standard” (no specific iso-
lation procedure), “Contact”, “Respiratory” and “Clostrid-
ium”. For rooms in the “Clostridium” category, strong 
hygiene measures are required: HCWs are to wear gloves 
and special clothes before entering the room, down-
ing gloves and clothes in the room before exit. Here, 
hand-hygiene compliance is considered as particularly 
important, especially after contact with the patient after 
removing gloves.
Contact data
We recorded close proximity face-to-face interac-
tions (“contacts”) among HCWs in the ward, using the 
proximity-sensing platform developed by the SocioPat-
terns collaboration [11] and described in detail in [12, 
16]. The SocioPatterns platform elements are open and 
commercially available from e.g. the Bitmanufaktur com-
pany (http://www.openbeacon.org). Participating indi-
viduals were asked to wear unobstrusive badges on their 
chests, equipped with radio-frequency identification sen-
sors that exchange ultra-low power radio data packets 
when close enough (1–1.5 m). The sensors were powered 
by batteries that ensured a lifetime of about 12 days, so 
that no battery exchange was necessary during the data 
collection (a new version of the sensors, currently under 
development, will ensure continuous functioning of the 
sensors for several months without change of battery). 
The system was tuned so that it detected and recorded 
close-range encounters during which a communica-
ble disease infection could be transmitted, for example, 
by cough, sneeze or hand contact. The temporal resolu-
tion was set to 20 s, and the information on face-to-face 
proximity events detected by the wearable sensors was 
relayed to radio receivers installed throughout the hos-
pital ward in a way to ensure redundancy (most events 
were registered by more than one radio receiver) and 
avoid data losses. A sensor was also placed in the toilet 
just above the washbasin and close to the HAS dispenser. 
Contacts registered between this sensor and wearable 
sensors of HCWs were interpreted as a signal of hand-
hygiene compliance.
MediHandTrace (MHT) data
Seven patient rooms, among the 16 in the ward, are 
currently equipped with the MediHandTrace infra-
structure (see http://www.medihandtrace.com), 
namely floor-embedded antennas able to read passive 
RFID (radio-frequency identification) tags inserted in 
the shoes of 11 of the 22 HCWs (4 medical doctors, 2 
nurses, 3 housekeeping staff and 2 nurses’ aids). Only 7 
rooms have up to now been equipped with such anten-
nas, as the system is still in an experimental phase. 
Moreover, the 11 HCWs who did not wear such shoes 
were medical students, who were in the ward only for 
few weeks, while the MHT surveillance system is cur-
rently permanently active and measurements focus on 
the permanent staff.
For each room, the antennas are located around the 
HAS dispensers (one outside and one inside the room), 
at the room door and around the patient’s bed [9]. The 
antennas are connected to a reader, which transmits 
the information to a central server through an Ether-
net connection. For each HCW equipped with a sensor, 
information about the presence in a room is detected 
by the antennas located at the room door, use of HAS 
is inferred by the detection of the sensors close to the 
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HAS dispensers, and the vicinity of the HCW to a 
patient is detected by the antenna located around the 
patient’s bed. These events are transmitted in real-time 
to a centralized server. The MHT infrastructure has 
been validated against direct observation in a previous 
publication [9].
Data analysis
We first analyzed each data set separately. For both data 
sets, we moreover exclude in the analysis the night peri-
ods, as almost no events were registered during these 
periods, and keep only the time intervals from 6:00 AM 
to 8:00 PM.
We studied the contacts between HCWs by focus-
ing on contact matrices giving the number and dura-
tions of contacts between categories of HCWs and 
on the temporal evolution of these quantities during 
the day. We moreover built the daily and global net-
works of contacts between HCWs: in such networks, 
nodes represent HCWs and a link is drawn between 
two nodes if the corresponding individuals have met 
at least once in the period considered; each link is 
weighted by the total duration of the contacts between 
the concerned HCWs during the aggregation period.
We analyzed the MHT data by measuring, for each 
HCW category, the average number and duration of 
visits in patient rooms, as measured by the antennas 
located at each room entrance, as a function of the 
hour of the day. We moreover considered the (daily 
and global) bipartite network of visits between HCWs 
and rooms: nodes represent either HCWs or rooms, 
and a link is drawn between a HCW-node and a room-
node if the corresponding HCW visited the room at 
least once; each link is weighted by the total duration 
of the visit(s) and can moreover be characterized by 
the HHC of the HCW during the visit. We also inves-
tigated the overall and individual HHC of HCWs.
Merging the two data sets yields a temporally resolved 
contact network between HCWs in which each contact 
is enriched by the information about the HHC of the 
involved HCWs before the contact. We considered spe-
cific examples of HCWs contact histories and explored 
how HCWs’ contacts can be divided into ‘at-risk’ and 
‘safe’ categories. We built the corresponding daily and 
global aggregated contact networks.
Ethics and privacy
An oral and written consent to participate in the study 
was obtained from the HCWs. In order to ensure ano-
nymity of the data, a random number was attributed to 
each participant when entered in the database. This study 
was declared to the French Commission on Individual 
Data Protection and Public Liberties (CNIL).
Results and discussion
Contact data
A total of 10,837 contact events was recorded during 
the study, with a cumulative duration equal to 453,960 s 
(~7566  min or 126  h). The durations of single contacts 
and the aggregated durations of contacts between HCWs 
were highly heterogeneous (see Additional file  1): most 
contacts had very short durations, but some were very 
long, with no characteristic interaction time-scale. Most 
contact activity occurred within the medical doctors cat-
egory on the one hand and between the nurses’ aids and 
the housekeeping staff on the other hand (Fig.  1a). We 
show in the Additional file 1 that daily contact matrices 
exhibit the same structure as the global one. Contacts 
occurred mostly between 10:00 and 14:00 for medi-
cal doctors and nurses, while contacts between nurses’ 
aids and housekeeping staff spread more evenly along 
the course of the day (Fig.  1b). More detailed insight 
into the contact patterns is provided by the contact net-
works of HCWs: the global aggregated network is shown 
in Fig.  2a) using a circular layout with HCWs grouped 
by category (daily networks are shown in the Additional 
file  1). Overall, medical doctors form a well-connected 
group connected to the rest of the network mostly 
through contacts with a couple of nurses. Figure 2b) pro-
vides network statistics for each HCW, namely, degree 
(i.e., the number of other HCWs with whom a given 
HCW has had contacts) and strength (i.e., cumulative 
contact time of each HCW). While the degrees do not 
exhibit very strong variations (as in other studies [12, 16, 
17]), different HCWs can have very different cumulative 
contact times. In particular, only 5 (resp. 10) HCWs out 
of 22 account for 44  % (resp. 72  %) of the total contact 
time of all HCWs. Figure 2c finally shows the possibility 
to focus on the contact history of a specific HCW and to 
capture at a glance how distinct contact patterns occured 
at specific periods: for instance, HCW 113 (housekeeping 
staff) met repeatedly HCW 127 (nurses’ aid) in different 
days, and met HCW 67 (medical doctor) for a long time 
but just on 1 day.
Visits to patients and hand‑hygiene compliance
During the data collection, 510 visits of HCWs to 
patients were registered with an average duration of 247 s 
(~4  min). Figure  3a shows that most visits occured in 
the first part of the day, with a peak before noon. Most 
visits were performed by nurses’ aids and housekeeping 
staff, while medical doctors performed only few visits, 
always around 1:00  PM. Figure  3b displays the bipartite 
network involving HCWs and rooms, aggregated over 
all the study (daily networks are shown in the Additional 
file 1): each link indicates that a HCW has visited a room 
at least once, and its width indicates the total (cumulated) 
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durations of the visits. The network is dense, with 63 
links out of the 77 possible (82 %). The degree of HCW 
nodes (number of different rooms visited) varies between 
2 and 7, while the degree of room nodes (number of dis-
tinct HCWs who have visited the room) goes from 7 to 
11. The figure highlights the weak participation of medi-
cal doctors to visits and, on the opposite, the large cumu-
lated time spent by some HCWs in some rooms.
For each visit registered by the antennas located at 
each room entrance, the MHT infrastructure gave 
moreover information on the occurrence of an event of 
proximity with the patient (“contact”), detected by the 
antennas located around the beds, and on the hand-
hygiene compliance of the HCW, as inferred by the 
proximity events registered by the antennas located 
around the HAS dispensers. For each HCW, we can 
thus compute the compliance by the fraction of detected 
visits including proximity with the patient for which 
proximity with the HAS dispensers was also detected. 
We note that this procedure has been validated against 
direct observation in Ref [9]. Figure  3c provides the 
resulting statistics on the use of HAS of each HCW 
before and/or after contact with a patient (further statis-
tics can be found in the SI). Consistently with previous 
studies [8, 9, 21, 22], completely correct use of HAS was 
rare (13 %), while many visits (49 %) occurred with no 
HAS use at all. The remaining visits were characterized 
by a partial use, mostly after contact with the patient: 
30  % (resp. 8  %) with HAS use after (resp. before) the 
contact. Note that we do not take into account here the 
potential use of the bathroom as an alternative way to 
wash hands after visit to a room, as the MHT infra-
structure by itself does not detect such events. We did 
not observe any clear trend of the hand-hygiene compli-
ance as a function of the number or durations of visits, 
nor depending on the type of isolation of the room (data 
in Additional file  1). Overall, hand-hygiene compli-
ance was scarce on average for all HCW categories, but 
Fig. 1 Contacts between health‑care workers. a Contact matrices: the top matrix gives at row X and column Y the aggregate duration of contacts 
between HCWs of category X and HCWs of category Y; in the second matrix, each (X, Y) entry is normalized by the number of HCWs in category X, 
giving thus the average time spent by a HCW of category X with all HCWs of category Y; in the bottom matrix, each entry is moreover normalized 
by the duration (in days) of the data collection. b Number (top) and aggregate duration (bottom) of contacts as a function of the hour of the day, 
averaged over all the days of data collection. Data are shown for all contacts and for some specific categories. MED medical doctors; NUR nurses; 
NURA nurses’ aids; HKS housekeeping staff
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important differences were observed between HCWs 
(see Additional file 1).
Merging the two datasets
We merged the data sets describing HCWs’ visits to 
patients’ rooms, their hand-hygiene compliance and 
their contacts, obtaining a detailed time-resolved pic-
ture of daily paths and contacts of HCWs with associated 
risks of hand transmission of pathogens due to the lack 
of hand-hygiene. The merged data concerns 9 HCWs: 2 
medical doctors, 2 nurses, 2 nurses aids, 3 housekeeping 
staff. Figure  4a illustrates the richness of the combined 
data by showing visits, hand-hygiene and contacts of a 
specific HCW (113): contacts of 113 occurring between 
two room visits are shown together, with a bar height 
proportional to the contacts’ durations, and the colored 
dot on top of the bar indicates if 113 used HAS or not 
after contact with a patient and before contact with the 
other HCWs. Information about the use of HAS by the 
HCW with whom 113 had a contact is also included.
We now focus on the contacts between two HCWs 
in which at least one of them participated to the MHT 
data collection, and such that the encounter occurred 
after a contact with a patient. This corresponds to 2593 
contact events (24 % of all contact events) of total dura-
tion 132,420  s (29  % of the aggregated duration of all 
contacts) and concerning 92 of the 182 links between 
HCWs (51 %). To each such contact, we can associate a 
risk of hand transmission of pathogens, depending on 
the HCW’s hand-hygiene compliance (note that we do 
not take into account here the contacts occurring at the 
start of the HCWs shifts, before they have any contact 
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Fig. 2 Contact network of health‑care workers. a Visualization of the contact network of HCWs, aggregated over the whole data collection. Each 
node represents a HCW (the number stands for the RFID number, the color for the category as indicated in the color code). A link between two 
nodes exists if at least one contact between the corresponding HCWs was detected, and the link thickness gives the aggregate duration of contacts. 
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of each node in the network of a. c Contact patterns of a specific HCW along several days. Each bar gives, for each hour of the day, the cumulative 
duration of contacts between HCW 113 (housekeeping staff ) and other HCWs identified each by a specific color. MED medical doctors, NUR nurses, 
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with patients). Here, hand-hygiene compliance after con-
tact with a patient can correspond either to the use of 
HAS in the same room in which contact with the patient 
occurred, as measured by MHT, or proximity to the bath-
room washbasin as detected by the SocioPatterns infra-
structure. Figure 4 reports the corresponding statistics at 
the level of pairs of HCWs (b) and of individual HCWs 
(c). Each bar gives the total duration of the measured 
contacts between a pair of HCWs (resp. of all contacts of 
each HCW), and is divided into durations of ‘at-risk’ and 
‘safe’ contacts, according to the use of HAS by the HCWs 
before the contact. The average aggregate duration of 
‘safe’ contacts was larger than the one of ‘at-risk’ contacts 
(286 vs. 190 s), but large variations, with both short and 
long contacts, were observed in each case. We did not 
observe any significant correlation between total contact 
durations and hand-hygiene compliance of HCWs. Over-
all, 7 HCWs out of 9 had contacts with other HCWs after 
contact with a patient and lack of HAS use.
Figure  5 finally illustrates how networks of contacts 
between HCWs can be enriched by the HHC data and 
divided into two networks corresponding to ‘at-risk’ and 
‘safe’ contacts. We show in Fig. 5 the global contact net-
work and two daily networks, each one split according 
to this criterion. In each layout, nodes are placed in the 
same location, and the link thickness corresponds to the 
aggregated duration of the contacts between the linked 
nodes. ‘At-risk’ and ‘safe’ contact networks show different 
patterns, with some links present in both while others are 
observed only in one. In particular, only the ‘at-risk’ net-
work should be considered in a hypothetical scenario of 
hand transmission of pathogens. Risk assessment analysis 
Fig. 3 MediHandTrace data: visits of health‑care workers to patient rooms and hand‑hygiene compliance. a Number (left) and aggregate durations 
(right) of visits of HCWs to patient rooms per hour of the day, averaged over all days of the data collection, for all HCWs and for each HCW category. 
b Bipartite network of visits of HCWs to patient rooms. Each node represents either a HCW (top row) or a room (bottom row). The size of a node 
depends on its strength (aggregate duration of visits). The color of each HCW‑node indicates its category, and red room-nodes indicate that the 
corresponding room was in “Clostridium” isolation during the whole data collection period. A link is drawn between a HCW and a room if the HCW 
visited the room at least once, and the link thickness depends on the aggregate duration of the visits. c Each bar gives the aggregated duration of 
all visits performed by a HCW. The total duration is split in different colors depending on the correct or incorrect use of HAS during the visits (correct 
use, use only before or after the contact with the patient, or no use at all). MED medical doctors; NUR nurses; NURA nurses’ aids; HKS housekeeping 
staff; HAS hydroalcoholic solution
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room with successive lack of HAS use. b Bar chart giving the aggregate duration of the contacts of each pair of HCWs. Only encounters between 
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should thus focus on this network and its characteristics. 
We also emphasize that Fig. 5 gives only static represen-
tations of a temporal network, in which each link repre-
sents an aggregation of several contact events. The whole 
data set includes the temporality of contacts together 
with their risk status in terms of hand-hygiene of the 
involved HCWs.
Discussion
The objective of this work was to show how merging 
data concerning contacts and hand-hygiene compliance 
of health-care workers in a hospital ward can provide an 
enriched picture of transmission risks in such contexts. 
Previous data collection and data-driven studies focused 
indeed typically on only one of these aspects. For each 
separate data set, we obtained results consistent with 
previous works. For instance, the duration of contacts 
was heterogeneous, with the coexistence of contacts of 
very different durations and the emergence of “supercon-
tactors” who account for a large fraction of all observed 
contacts [12, 14, 16, 17]. In terms of contagion risk, this 
implies that different contacts can correspond to very 
different probabilities of transmitting a pathogen. The 
contact network was moreover strongly structured as in 
other studies [12, 14, 16, 17]. These results confirm the 
need to go beyond the contact matrix description that 
only accounts for averaged contact durations between 
different categories of workers [20] and to include 
Fig. 5 Networks of HCWs contacts informed by the hand‑hygiene compliance data. In each network, similarly to Fig. 2a, nodes represent HCWs, 
with a different color according to each HCW’s category, and a link between two nodes indicates that the corresponding HCWs have been in contact 
at least once. Here only contacts for which at least one of the HCWs was monitored by the MediHandTrace (MHT) infrastructure, and occurring after 
at least one of the HCWs involved had a contact with a patient, are taken into account. We create two contact networks by integrating the informa‑
tion about hand‑hygiene compliance of HCWs: the network of green links corresponds to contacts in which HCWs monitored by MHT have used 
HAS before the contact; the network of red links corresponds to contacts occurring after at least one of the HCWs had a contact with a patient and 
did not use HAS afterwards. In each network, the links thickness depends on the aggregate duration of contacts. a Networks aggregated over the 
whole data collection; b two examples of daily contact networks. MED medical doctors; NUR nurses; NURA nurses’ aids; HKS housekeeping staff, HAS 
hydroalcoholic solution
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Fig. 6 Illustration of the complexity of the network including HCWs’ contacts and rooms’ visits. a An example of the different types of contacts 
involving a specific healthcare worker after a visit to a patient. The hand‑hygiene compliance can affect both HCWs and patients, with four possible 
scenarios according to the use of HAS before and after the visit, as illustrated in the figure: the first line corresponds to HCW 113 using HAS before 
contact with a patient (green arrow from 113 towards the room) and also after the contact with the patient and before the contact with the other 
HCW (green arrow towards the other HCW); the second line corresponds to HCW 113 having a contact with the patient in the room without previous 
use of HAS (hence a risk of transmission to the patient red arrow) but using HAS after the contact with the patient and before contact with the other 
HCW. Lines 3 and 4 correspond to the scenarios of lines 1 and 2 respectively, but without use of HAS after the contact with the patient. b Network 
of all the contacts between a specific HCW (113), patients (indicated by their room number) and other HCWs during a specific day. A link between 
two nodes exists if the contact was observed at least once in the day; green and red links correspond to the use (or lack thereof ) of HAS before the 
contact with the patient or between contact with patient and contact with HCW; the thickness of each link stands for the cumulative duration of 
the corresponding contacts. This figure integrates the information about at‑risk and safe contacts of Fig. 5a with the information about the use of 
HAS before the visit to the patient (i.e., the risk associated to the encounters HCW‑patient). MED medical doctors; NUR nurses; NURA nurses’ aids; HKS 
housekeeping staff, HAS hydroalcoholic solution
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information about contact network structure and hetero-
geneity of contacts duration in data-driven models of dis-
ease spreading or in outbreak investigations.
Differently from other studies, most contacts 
were observed among medical doctors and between 
nurses’aids and housekeeping staff, due to a specific 
organization of work in the ward with pairs of one AS 
and one ASH working together.
With regards to hand-hygiene compliance, results were 
in line with other studies [8, 9, 21, 22], with only 13 % of 
visits of HCWs to room patients including a correct use 
of HAS (both before and after contact with the patient). 
The widely spread lack of hand-hygiene compliance 
emphasizes the interest of merging the two data sets: on 
the one hand, the risk of pathogen transmission during 
a contact between HCWs can strongly depend on the 
occurrence of visits to patients and of the corresponding 
use of HAS (or lack thereof ) after contact with a patient 
and before the HCW-HCW contact; on the other hand, 
it shows how lack of HAS use should not be considered 
as an isolated phenomenon but can have far-reaching 
consequences as pathogens transmitted from a patient 
to a HCW could then easily be transmitted through the 
HCW contact network and spread throughout the ward. 
It emphasizes how each contact with a patient and each 
hand-washing event are not isolated events but part of a 
complex network of events.
We have illustrated how simple visualizations of 
HCWs visits and contacts can be obtained by such data 
and could be of use in outbreak investigation. We have 
also shown how the network analysis of HCWs’ con-
tacts is enriched by taking into account hand-hygiene 
data. The network could be made even richer by com-
bining the networks of HCWs’ contacts and visits, and 
assigning a risk to each link according to the use of 
HAS. Note that in the present proof-of-concept study, 
we have focused on use of HAS after contact with a 
patient, which determines the risk of HCW-HCW con-
tacts, while such an enriched network could also encode 
information on the use of HAS before the contact with 
a patient in the links between room-nodes and HCW-
nodes, as illustrated in Fig. 6. This network thus includes 
information not only on the risk of pathogen transmis-
sion between HCWs but also from HCWs to patients 
and provides a picture of the possible paths of pathogen 
transmission in the ward that would be more complete 
than usual descriptions based only on contact patterns 
(due to the complexity of the representation, we show 
in Fig. 6 only the part of the network around a specific 
HCW.) We finally note that other potential ways of 
transmission of pathogens between HCWs and HCWs 
and patients exist in a ward, such as through cloth-
ing and equipment. A perfect, but obviously idealized, 
surveillance system would therefore be able to monitor 
also their correct use and disposal.
Conclusion
Hand-hygiene compliance data strongly enrich the infor-
mation concerning contacts among health-care workers: 
indeed, each contact can be assigning a ‘safe’ or ‘at-risk’, 
yielding two distinct ‘at-risk’ and ‘safe’ contact networks. 
The resulting enriched temporal contact network could 
be of high relevance for outbreak investigation and to 
inform data-driven models of nosocomial disease spread.
Further work includes repeated data collections and 
analysis in order to test the robustness of the statistical 
patterns observed, as well as the design of data-driven 
models informed by the collected data to simulate the 
potential spread of pathogens and identify efficient con-
tainment measures in case of an outbreak. The results 
presented here will also be used to provide feedback to 
HCWs and attract their attention on the complex inter-
play of contacts and hand-washing events and how lack 
of hand-hygiene compliance can potentially lead to con-
sequences involving the whole network of HCWs. As the 
question of how to increase hand-hygiene compliance 
among HCWs is still wide open [21], the effect of such 
feedback could then be measured in a new data collec-
tion campaign.
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